Doubts have emerged over whether a State of Emergency, which grants sweeping powers to security forces, will help end the 19-month-long insurgency in southern Thailand. Even since the decree was put in place on July 16, beheadings, shootings and bombings have continued.
The decision by Thailand's prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, to implement emergency rule across three provinces in southern Thailand has been labelled unconstitutional and criticised as unlikely to end the insurgency which has claimed more than 820 lives in the Muslim-majority region since January 2004.
The State of Emergency Decree grants impunity to security officials while giving them sweeping powers to search and detain suspects without warrants. The region had been under martial law, but the new decree moves decision-making away from southern military commanders directly into the prime minister's office in Bangkok.
State of emergencySecurity adviser to the Thai government's southern command, Panitan Wattanayagorn, says the decree will make it easier for security forces to detain suspects because the security agencies are now unified under one command.
"Instead of going through normal channels, which of course involved a lot of departmental approvals, now it depends on one single agency - which is a criminal court - to grant permission. That will allow them to move quite quickly," he said.
But it is the concentration of power in the prime minister's office which has critics worried the decree could put civil rights at risk.
"There is no guarantee at all that [the prime minister] will restrict his new power within the boundary of the constitution which protects rights and freedom," said Sunai Phasuk from international human rights organisation, Human Rights Watch.
The National Reconciliation Commission, established in March 2005 to draw up a road map for peace, has also expressed reservations. Its chairman, former prime minister, Anand Panyarachun, says local authorities might abuse their increased powers, making it even less likely for villagers to come forward with vital information.
"I think that the mistreatment in the past have left sour taste in the mouth of the people. They do not trust government, they do not trust the people who work for the government," he said.
His concerns are echoed by some local residents who fear curfews may prevent them from attending dawn prayers at the mosque, and worry bans on public gatherings could impede religious celebrations such as weddings.
"The decree has both good and bad parts, but the authorities have too much power. They might violate people's rights. This may affect our personal lives," said 30-year-old Abdulrohsau Bangolae.
Heavy-handed response
The mistrust of government is a result of what many consider to be the heavy-handed tactics of authorities and the apparent impunity of security personnel, according to Francesca Lawe-Davies, an analyst with the International Crisis Group (ICG), who has made two extended research visits to Thailand's south in recent months.
Ms Law-Davies says extra-judicial killings, disappearances and arbitrary arrests are making people nervous.
"People are very scared of the police, who have an atrocious human rights record, and of the heavy military presence in the region.
"In fact one local community officer quipped to me that, 'We're not frightened of any so-called terrorist, we're much more frightened of the police'," she said.
No top-level officials have been held accountable for civilian deaths. This is despite four generals being implicated by investigative commissions into the Tak Bai and Krue Se incidents. At least 85 Muslim men and boys suffocated after being crammed into army trucks following a protest outside a police station in Tak Bai in October 2004, and 32 men were killed when soldiers opened fire on the Krue Se mosque in April 2004.
Historical differences
While the current spate of violence flared in January 2004 - when unknown militants burned schools and police posts and stole weapons from a military store in a series of coordinated attacks - the region has a decades-long history of unrest.
Unlike the rest of Thailand which is mainly Buddhist, the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, Narathiwat and certain districts of Songhlka, are home to the country's Muslim minority.
The region was part of the ancient Kingdom of Pattani, and was a semi-autonomous Malay region, before being annexed by Thailand in 1902. The indigenous people speak their own language, Jawi, a Malay dialect, and probably have more in common with their Malaysian neighbours than their Thai compatriots.
Armed separatist groups were active in the area from the 1960s, but when the national government implemented political and economic reforms in the 1980s popular support for the insurgency waned. Hundreds of separatist fighters accepted a broad amnesty and the movement looked to be quashed by the mid-90s.
A recent report by the ICG, "Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad", concludes the unrest stems from a century of discrimination and assimilation policies by successive national governments in Bangkok.
"The current violence is driven by local grievances, and there is no evidence of external involvement", says ICG South East Asia project director, Sidney Jones.
Who to blame?
While the insurgency has been largely attributed to Muslim insurgents, no group has claimed responsibility for any of the attacks, leading some analysts to believe the perpetrators are a mix of separatists, organised criminals and corrupt officials.
"The insurgency is often used as a cover to settle personal or business disputes," said ICG's Ms Lawe-Davies.
This view is shared by more than half the respondents in a recent poll by Thailand's respected Assumption University who blame the violence on clashes between corrupt government officials and black market dealers, as well as narcotraffickers.
There have been notes left after some attacks saying that Muslims who work for the government, or whose salaries are paid for by the government, will be targeted. But there doesn't appear to be any coordinated extremist movement.
The ICG has identified four separatist groups operating in the region: The National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate, which re-emerged after fighting in the 60s for an independent Patani state; Pemuda, a separatist youth movement; Patani Islamic Mujahidin Group, established by Afghanistan veterans intent on an independent Islamic state; and, New PULO, also fighting for an independent state.
"But the cell structure is very defuse. There isn't a very centralised command and the cells are small - between five and 20 people - and very secretive," Ms Lawe-Davies said.
Is there an end in sight?
Incidents have been on the rise in recent months - averaging about 120 per month - and a spate of beheadings in June and July indicate current policy is not working.
Panitan Wattanayagorn believes the emergency powers might help but not in isolation.
"I think the government needs a much more balanced approach to the southern areas - combining economic, social and political dimensions all together," he said.
But regaining the trust of the Thailand's Muslims will take time and until there is trust, people will be unlikely to cooperate with security forces, says Ms Lawe-Davies.
"It's very important that the government engage more deeply and for a longer period with southern leaders, people who understand better the grievances which are fuelling this violence and sympathy for it," she said.
And while there is no evidence of foreign involvement in the insurgency yet, there is a danger that, if not resolved, the dispute has the potential to draw in militants from other countries in the region, such as Malaysia or Indonesia.
"If this situation is left to fester, it could attract jihadists from outside Thailand," says ICG's Sidney Jones.
And then the Thai government would have an even bigger problem on its hands.
Related links:
Please Note: These sites are not part of ABC Online, and the ABC has no editorial control over their content.
More In Focus Articles